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In a centuries-old debate among contracts scholars, one group supports a
presumption favoring a text-centered approach to the interpretation of a writ-
ten agreement—the plain meaning taken from the four corners—while oppo-
nents urge a broader understanding of context—what the parties intended and
the circumstances of their negotiation. The contending positions have so hard-
ened that, in a jarring juxtaposition this Essay will reveal, recent academic
classifications of the same state laws are exactly opposite to each other: contex-
tualists classify certain states as contextualist that textualists say are textualist!
Yet despite the persistence of acute polarization, the author also docu-
ments—and applauds—promising trends in the literature toward hybridiza-
tion and compromise, a search for factors to guide the selection of interpretive
tools rather than putting some off limits or setting up default rule presump-
tions. While scholars have thus long obscured a common-sense reality, a new
wave of research is making it clearer to all sides that text and context are both
useful, depending on the details of different jobs.
More modern, advanced, and sensible, this new view of contract interpre-
tation replaces a stubborn “winner-take-all” approach to the debate with a
flexible and practical “best-tool-for-the-job” approach. To illuminate its im-
portance and value—call it contract interpretation 2.0—this Essay turns to
Warren Buffett’s contracting philosophy and practices. The famous investor
and businessman is also a polyglot teacher, and his approach to contracts,
especially acquisition agreements and employment arrangements, illustrates
the imperative of using the right tool for the job.
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[Y]ou cannot prove a mere private convention between the
two parties to give language a different meaning from its com-
mon one . . . to show that when they said 500 feet they agreed
it should mean 100 inches, or that Bunker Hill Monument
should signify the Old South Church.
—Oliver Wendell Holmes1
[T]hough a private convention is not competent to change the
meaning of five hundred feet to one hundred inches, or the
meaning of Bunker Hill Monument to the Old South Church,
the local or technical usage, if different from ordinary or nor-
mal usage, may be competent to produce this result.
—Samuel Williston2
White can be made to mean black, five can be made to mean
ten, 500 feet can be made to mean 100 inches, and Bunker Hill
Monument can be made to signify Old South Church.
—Arthur L. Corbin3
INTRODUCTION
Some written agreements are so clear and manifestly complete
that it would waste time and risk error to weigh competing narratives
about the background of a deal to make sense of its terms. Other writ-
ten agreements, however, are so opaque and fragmentary that it
would be hubristic to believe a person can confidently discern mean-
ing or intention from the document alone.
1 Goode v. Riley, 28 N.E. 228, 228 (Mass. 1891). But see Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,
425 (1918) (“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which
it is used.”).
2 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON’S TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 611, at 1180 (1926).
3 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.8, at 54–55 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 1998).
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Despite such intuitions, many leading contracts professors for
nearly a century have argued in favor of either a formal text-centered
approach or a context-oriented approach to the interpretation of all or
broad categories of written agreements with little regard for how both
tools are useful depending on the details of different jobs. Increas-
ingly, however, some scholars are acknowledging the reality that dif-
ferent settings warrant different approaches.4 They follow the law in
many states, which evades tidy classification as textualist or contextu-
alist because, rather than wedded to one school, courts often choose
the more suitable doctrine given the interpretation task at hand.5
Part I of this Symposium Essay briskly reviews the historical
terms of this binary debate. Discussion culminates in a revealing juxta-
position of recent academic classifications of state law on this subject:
the same states are presented in starkly different ways, as contextual-
ist by contributors to the contextualist Corbin treatise, and as textual-
ist in research commissioned by two of today’s leading defenders of
formalism, Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott.6 Any number
of similar examples could be collated to reflect the wide variety of
tools in actual use by judges within and across states. This Essay com-
pares Corbin with Schwartz-Scott because the author was one of the
editors of the Corbin treatise and found the contrast both striking and
potentially inculpating.
Part II offers a slightly longer review of recent scholarship, show-
ing both the persistence of stubborn polarization and the light of a
new hybridization ahead. Selections highlight principal positions and
trends, especially toward hybridization, compromise, and search for
factors to guide the selection of interpretive tools rather than putting
some off limits or ranking them according to some default rule
hierarchy.
Part III turns to the philosophy and practice of contracts accord-
ing to Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway. Legal scholarship tends
4 See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules:
The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REV. 506, 508 (2005); Juliet
P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a
Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 44 (2007–2008).
5 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 540 (1998) (“In virtually every
jurisdiction, one finds irreconcilable cases, frequent changes in doctrine, confusion, and cries of
despair.”); William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Inter-
pretation of Written Contracts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 931, 940 (“[V]ery often within a single jurisdic-
tion there are both hard and soft [parol evidence rule] decisions.”).
6 See infra Appendix.
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to focus on law cases or theory, but recent efforts increasingly look at
actual contracts and parties, with particular interest in corporation ac-
quisition agreements, and the question of formal contract versus infor-
mal trust. This author chose to contribute insight from Berkshire
Hathaway because of personal experience with the company and its
culture and because the company’s practices provide a rich trove of
material.
I. HISTORICAL DEBATE AND SOME CURIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS
The formalist position held sway throughout most of the history
of contract interpretation in the United States, stretching back to the
late nineteenth century. Professor Samuel Williston’s treatise, first
published in 1920–1922 and expanded in 1938, stated a strong evi-
dence exclusion rule (the “parol evidence rule”), a limit to a docu-
ment’s “four corners,” and a “plain meaning” rule.7
The realist movement raised doubt about these stances, prescrib-
ing a broader search of context in contract interpretation. Professor
Karl Llewellyn pushed for this take in commercial law, helping to
craft the “incorporation” approach in the Uniform Commercial Code,
released in the mid-1950s and adopted nationwide by the next decade.
Llewellyn, presciently, appreciated the wide variety of contract types
and urged a correspondingly contextual approach to interpretation.8
Start with the writing, yes, but determine meaning according to all
probative circumstances: “the contract in fact,” he called it, including
course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade.9
With even greater force, Professor Arthur Corbin—Llewellyn’s
teacher—spent decades in the mid- to late twentieth century challeng-
ing the formalist approach as an intellectual matter.10 How could any
writing prove its own completeness and how can any word or docu-
ment prove its own meaning, he wondered. Scholars by the score and
judges by the dozen were persuaded. The apotheosis of Corbin’s influ-
ence was a series of 1968 opinions by Chief Justice Roger Traynor of
7 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Toward a Prudential and Credibility-Centered Parol Evi-
dence Rule, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 296–99 (2000). Williston is often portrayed as a staunch
formalist, but as the epigraphs to this Essay suggest, this is not entirely accurate, as his approach
was more pragmatic than that.
8 See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 400 (2004).
9 Id. at 467–69.
10 See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and
Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1231–34, 1236 (1999).
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the California Supreme Court, who sparked a judicial trend in favor of
this approach.11 The approach is also adopted expressly in the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, drafted during the 1960s and 1970s
and released widely during the 1980s.12
Corbin’s intellectual critique succeeded: all participants in the de-
bate, including staunch formalists, now agree that the plain meaning
rule is suspect because words rarely have one plain or true meaning
ascertainable from an inspection of a writing alone.13 Fellow contract
law scholars joined forces, in both law review articles and treatises.14
By the 1990s, this trend, soon to be called contextualism, softened the
parol evidence rule, loosened the four corners doctrine, and diluted
the plain meaning rule.15 By 1999, a dozen states could be counted in
the vanguard.16
Yet while the Restatement (Second) has been influential on many
topics in contract law—most adopted and cited without discussion or
debate17—its influence on interpretation has been more limited.18 And
the contextualist trend soon slowed, as a resurgent formalism has
taken hold since 1991, as Schwartz and Scott discerned a strong pref-
erence for this approach among many parties, especially businesses.19
Most recently, the pair authored two seminal articles urging formalism
11 E.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
643–48 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (Traynor, C.J.).
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 210, 212, 214 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
13 I call the response the “plain enough meaning rule.” Cunningham, supra note 7, at 295 R
n.117.
14 E.g., John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule
and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333, 345 (1966–1967); E. Allan Farnsworth,
“Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940–42 (1967); John E. Murray, Jr., The
Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342, 1344 (1975).
15 See Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality
as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REV. 643, 644 n.2 (1995).
16 KNIFFIN, supra note 3, § 24.7. Besides California: Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Mis- R
souri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. Id.
17 Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 515–17 (1998).
18 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596–98 (1995) (attributing this to features of the drafting committee and
process); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 757, 821–22 (2004) (attributing this to a resurgent formalism generally).
19 See ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 204–24 (2d ed. 1991) (demonstrating that merchants opt out of many U.C.C. pro-
visions—for example, merchants regularly use contract clauses to disclaim U.C.C. standard war-
ranties— and questioning whether the statute meets their needs).
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as the default rule for business contracts, one in 200320 and another in
2010.21
Throughout this period, a striking difference appeared in the judi-
cial versus academic worlds: while judges continued to choose one of
the two doctrines to interpret a contract in cases before them, profes-
sors insisted that one or the other way was superior. Even scholarly
classifications of the cases seemed to reflect this difference. For in-
stance, many states are classified as contextualist by one leading au-
thority—Corbin on Contracts—and as textualist in another—research
commissioned by Schwartz and Scott (referred to below as the S&S
Survey).22 Some highlights follow; a table in the appendix juxtaposes
quotes and citations, which may be worthwhile to skim now.
Many differences in this juxtaposition can be explained on vari-
ous, somewhat technical grounds—such as date, state versus federal
law, high state court or low, degree of clarity, and so on. But ulti-
mately the best explanation for these and innumerable other such ap-
parent anomalies is the inherent untidiness of the cases.23 They are
products of the peculiar facts and procedural posture of a given case
and the outlook and temperament of the given judge as well as the
wider state of thought on questions of both contract law generally,
interpretation particularly, and broader intellectual movements.24
20 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Limits].
21 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926,
929 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Redux] (describing their 2003 piece as “iconic”).
22 Compare KNIFFIN, supra note 3, § 24.7 (Corbin treatise classifying series of states as part R
of a contextualist trend; the author participated in drafting some of these examples), with
Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 21, at 928 n.1 (citing Robert E. Scott, State by State Survey R
(Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter S&S Survey]) (reporting unpublished state-by-state survey supporting
dominant formalist outlook; on request, Professor Scott supplied the survey to the author).
23 Differences may also be methodological. The Corbin treatise was prepared over many
years to report cases as they were decided without necessarily a systemic attempt at an overall
classification. The S&S Survey indicates having “looked at major cases within each state to see
whether courts follow the New York common law ‘textual’ approach, or the California contex-
tual approach.” S&S Survey, supra note 22. Acknowledging that conclusions are “a bit rough” R
due to some inconsistencies within states, the authors found most courts follow the former. Id.
The S&S Survey’s assessment of the textualist approach blends the stern parol evidence rule,
four corners rule, and plain meaning rule. So if a court embraces any of these, the S&S Survey
appears to classify it as textualist. That is certainly a fair approach. But on the other hand, the
parol evidence rule may be formalist, but it is not truly textualist: it actually operates to exclude
texts—as well as oral statements—based on their timing not their tenor; it never excludes evi-
dence on the grounds that evidence is about meaning.
24 Excerpting passages from judicial opinions to determine a state’s position in complex
debates recalls Llewellyn’s classic compendium of canons of statutory construction that depict
courts firmly intoning that “The Law is X,” juxtaposed with an equally majestic statement that
“The Law is not X.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
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With Illinois, for example, Corbin cited a 1999 intermediate ap-
pellate opinion expressly declaring the need to look at “context,” not
merely a “dictionary,” and a Seventh Circuit opinion saying “Illinois
cases continue to allow extrinsic evidence [to show ambiguity].”25 The
S&S Survey, after acknowledging “[s]ome inconsistency, but generally
follow[ing] the textual, common law approach,”26 cites a 1999 Illinois
Supreme Court case, with the comment, “although the court sug-
gested that it may later adopt another approach, still follows the four
corners rule,” and quotes that opinion’s endorsement of the plain
meaning rule.27
For Nevada, Corbin cited a 1991 Nevada Supreme Court opinion
engaging with the debate and coming down clearly on the contextual-
ist side, while the S&S Survey cited a 2008 Nevada Supreme Court
opinion stating a more traditional version of the parol evidence rule,
which does not cite the earlier case.28 For New Hampshire, Corbin
cited two state supreme court opinions supporting the contextual ap-
proach whereas the S&S Survey cites a reformation-due-to-mistake
case, without providing an illustrative quotation, which cites Corbin
and the Restatement (Second) extensively in support of doing so de-
spite what the writing plainly said.29
In both Missouri and Pennsylvania, neither Corbin nor the S&S
Survey identified any cases of their respective supreme courts; rather,
Corbin cited federal appellate courts applying the respective state’s
law and the S&S Survey cited intermediate state courts.30 For Penn-
sylvania, Corbin quoted a 1981 Third Circuit opinion confidently pre-
dicting a thoroughgoing contextualist approach, while the S&S Survey
quoted two intermediate appellate court opinions stating the plain
meaning rule and a traditional, firm parol evidence rule. For Missouri,
Corbin quoted a 1984 Eighth Circuit opinion that rejected the plain
meaning rule to insist on hearing evidence of surrounding circum-
stances, whereas the S&S Survey quoted intermediate appellate cases
from 1975, 2001, 2002, and 2008 stating formalist doctrines.31
app. C (1960). For a current attempt to overcome the problem as a matter of interpretation of
statutes and constitutions, see William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017).
25 See infra Appendix.
26 S&S Survey, supra note 22. R
27 See infra Appendix.
28 See infra Appendix.
29 See infra Appendix.
30 See infra Appendix.
31 See infra Appendix.
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The same variation can even be seen in the two states that are
widely seen as exemplars of the contending camps—New York as tex-
tualist and California as contextualist.32 True, a few famous cases in
each state illustrate the opposing ideologies, and the appearance of
these cases in casebooks does emit a sense that those states stand for
the competing schools. But there is greater complexity beyond these
surfaces.
The leading New York case, Mitchill v. Lath,33 adopts a Willis-
tonian position in refusing to consider evidence of an alleged side
agreement to remove an unsightly structure as part of a real estate
sales agreement.34 Yet in addition to a vigorous dissent in the case
disputing how the rule was applied, New York’s most influential
judge, Benjamin Cardozo, came down clearly on Corbin’s side and left
behind precedents upon which New York state judges continue to
draw.35
In California, Traynor’s Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (“PG&E”)36 opinion remains the
beacon of contextualism, but has been roundly criticized, including
prominently by Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski in Trident Center v.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.37 And while the California Su-
preme Court has not overruled PG&E,38 language in later cases con-
flicts with it.39 Professor Susan Martin surveyed the California cases,
32 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2010).
33 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
34 Id. at 647.
35 E.g., Utica City Nat’l Bank v Gunn, 118 N.E. 607, 608 (N.Y. 1918) (“To take the pri-
mary or strict meaning is to make the whole transaction futile. To take the secondary or loose
meaning, is to give it efficacy and purpose. In such a situation, the genesis and aim of the transac-
tion may rightly guide our choice.”); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y.
1917) (“The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal.”); see Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formal-
ism, and the Fiction of Noninterventionism, 28 PACE L. REV. 315, 324 (2008).
36 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (Traynor, C.J.).
37 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying California law). A promissory note dis-
claimed right of prepayment yet the borrower proffered evidence supporting an alternative
meaning based on another clause providing for prepayment upon default—and the court felt
constrained, against its better judgment, to admit it under California law. Id. at 569–70.
38 On January 11, 2017, the California Supreme Court declined the opportunity to do so
when it chose not to review the lower court’s decision in Jibe Audio LLC v. Beats Electronics,
LLC, No. B267633, 2016 WL 4978409 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2016), petition for review denied,
No. S238096 (Cal. Jan. 11, 2017).
39 See Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court of San Mateo Cty., 834 P.2d 1148, 1155 (Cal.
1992) (en banc) (holding that a contract with a choice-of-law clause was unambiguous on its face
under important textualist policy which argues against exposing written contracts “to alteration
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finding a richer and more variegated doctrinal approach than either
repudiation or embrace, pure contextualism or its opposite.40
Yet despite judicial recognition of the unruliness of words and
documents—sometimes manifestly clear and complete, sometimes
neither—some still insist there should be one law of contract interpre-
tation or at the very least a default rule system.41 On the other hand,
there are signs of an emergence of a greater interest in delineating
appropriate tools according to contract type.42 Even so, enough of the
historical polarization persists to obscure this laudable goal, as a selec-
tive review of the recent literature will suggest.
II. CONTEMPORARY DEBATE AND THE MOVE TO COMPROMISE
The contract interpretation debate is not solely about text versus
context but also implicates several intertwined policy issues. For one,
which approach better promotes efficiency values such as commercial
certainty and predictability? Textualism might, to the extent that par-
ties preparing written agreements know where they stand. Yet contex-
tualism might to the extent parties know disputes will be resolved
based on all relevant information. Contextualists, therefore, can claim
to be probing the particular subjective intentions of the very parties to
a transaction whereas textualists must be content with saying that in
many cases the generally understood objective meaning of words is
enforced.
In each case, moreover, there is risk of judicial error—not dis-
cerning meaning accurately, whether subjective or objective. And
there are costs: formalism might induce greater ex ante investment in
drafting clarity with reduced ex post costs of dispute resolution
by self-serving recitals based upon fading memories of antecedent events[,] . . . a serious impedi-
ment to the certainty required in commercial transactions”); see also Wagner v. Columbia Pic-
tures Indus., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898, 903 (2007) (excluding extrinsic evidence that
“contradict[ed]” an integrated contract on the ground that such evidence cannot be used “to
show intention independent of an unambiguous written instrument”); Machado v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 233 Cal. App. 3d 347, 352 & n.3 (1991) (“The cardinal requirement in the construction [of a
contract] is that the intention of the parties as gathered from the four corners of the instrument
must govern.”).
40 Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge Kozinski, There Is a Parol Evidence Rule in Cali-
fornia—The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1995).
41 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 42 (2014) (attributing hardened
polar positions in debate to a “shared presumption of the unitary nature of contract law and the
mandatory nature of interpretation doctrine”).
42 See James W. Bowers, Murphy’s Law and the Elementary Theory of Contract Interpreta-
tion: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 587, 590 & n.12 (2005) (citing
numerous articles).
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whereas contextualism might reduce ex ante drafting costs while in-
creasing ex post enforcement costs.43 The net costs can be modeled.44
But at bottom, these models pose empirical questions that evade de-
finitive resolution.45 Instead, scholars have inferred the costs of each
methodology from observations about the propensity of parties to
choose one state’s laws over another, or from the propensity of trade
associations to craft their own rules.46
Above all, these issues—efficiency, intent, error risk, and costs—
vary across contract types and participants, a reality courts have long
understood but that contemporary scholarship only lately seems
poised to develop. For instance, while Schwartz and Scott in 2003 ar-
gued in favor of a textualist default rule, they expressly acknowledged:
“A textualist theory of interpretation, however, will not suit all parties
all of the time.”47 They also stressed that their default rule prescription
is designed solely for business contracts, not necessarily consumer
contracts—a good, useful distinction, though the wide variety of con-
tracts warrants more than those two dimensions alone.
A. The Stubbornness of Traditional Dualism
In 2003, and amplified in 2010, Schwartz and Scott observed that
businesses likely want their contracts to be interpreted accurately, as
intended, but when disputes arise, both sides push for competing in-
terpretations; it is costly for courts to determine the truth and they
cannot guarantee finding it.48 So there is a trade-off between accuracy
and cost. Assuming this is true, what would most contracting parties,
ex ante, want courts to do when resolving future unknown disputes:
focus on the writing or admit extrinsic evidence? The former is obvi-
ously cheaper administratively but the latter may yield the correct an-
43 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 883 (2010) (“The ex ante cost of drafting more pre-
cise contract language may be greater than the expected litigation cost entailed in enforcing the
standard.”); id. at 852 (“[D]rawing on the line of scholarship that analyzes the rules-standards
dichotomy in the design of legal rules, recent work frames the choice between vague and precise
contract terms as a tradeoff in information costs: precise contract provisions raise contracting
costs on the front end, but reduce enforcement costs at the back end.”).
44 E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1581, 1583 (2005).
45 Steven J. Burton, A Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott
on Contract Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J. 339, 352 (2013).
46 E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724 (2001); Miller, supra
note 32, at 1477. R
47 Schwartz & Scott, Limits, supra note 20, at 547. R
48 See id. at 580; Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 21, at 952–55. R
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swer; the former adds some transaction costs toward setting forth
terms accurately.
According to Schwartz and Scott, however, most businesses
would prefer the formalist approach and to exclude evidence, even
relevant evidence. Because it is the parties’ contracts, their prefer-
ences should rule, and courts should therefore take the formalist ap-
proach, at least generally.49 Schwartz and Scott stress that preferences
are heterogeneous and that some parties might ex ante prefer a con-
textualist approach to interpretation.50 That also means enforcing
written choice-of-interpretation directives, such as integration or no-
oral-modification clauses—which not all courts do.51 Schwartz and
Scott stress that they are by no means arguing for adoption of
mandatory rules of formalist interpretation, only that this be the de-
fault rule.
As to ambiguity, Schwartz and Scott say parties will be satisfied
when courts have enough information to reach the correct answer “on
average.”52 They say, as to type of language, that the plain meaning
rule applies when written in ordinary language, whereas a contextual
default admits evidence to interpret technical language.53 On the four
corners rule, the assumption that parties prefer formal approaches en-
dorses it along with a firm parol evidence rule that restricts extrinsic
evidence. This, they say, comports with what most U.S. courts do,
based on their survey.54
This is as formalist as they go, recognizing they are not literalists
or fools, as “literalism is impossible.”55 Rather, the argument is that
businesses will generally prefer that courts exclude various categories
of evidence, including pre-contractual negotiations and course of deal-
ing. True, they acknowledge, such information may improve the
chances that a judge would correctly discern intention. But their pri-
mary point is that the costs of doing so are high. The author would
add a final qualification to this prescription, which is that regardless of
49 See Schwartz & Scott, Limits, supra note 20, at 583. R
50 See Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 21, at 930 n.11. R
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 12, § 179 cmt. a, illus. 1 (illus- R
trating that a court might decide as a matter of public policy not to enforce a clause that states
“no prior negotiations shall be used to interpret this agreement” if enforcing it would “unreason-
ably deprive it of relevant evidence” to resolve ambiguity and “thereby hamper it in the fair
administration of justice”).
52 See Schwartz & Scott, Limits, supra note 20, at 618. R
53 See Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 21, at 932. R
54 See infra Appendix.
55 Schwartz & Scott, Redux, supra note 21, at 933. R
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whatever preference a business has for formally negotiated and writ-
ten business contracts, most business contracts are not reached that
way but rather formed by email, phone, the exchange of forms, or in
meetings, where determining terms without context is challenging at
best.56
Professor Steven Burton offers a critique of Schwartz and Scott
and an alternative, illustrating the traditional approach to debate in
this area which seeks to prescribe alternative one-size-fits-all solu-
tions.57 Burton says what is “novel and crucial” in Schwartz and
Scott’s work is their thesis that majoritarian preference is judicial ac-
curacy on average.58 Burton cannot imagine what average accuracy
entails in determinations of linguistic meaning—especially in court. In
the author’s view, most might happily trade error for cost savings, and
textualism with limited evidence might do that—parties only need to
clarify their drafts up to the point of getting 50-50 accuracy and cut
litigation costs by leaving evidence out. But Burton calls average accu-
racy “incoherent” and it may well be an unreliable baseline given the
nature of both litigation and language (ambiguity, vagueness, dialect,
context).59 So Burton believes that most firms will not concur in seek-
ing the correct answer on average because there is no such thing.
Burton observes that the hypothesis of trading off accuracy for
savings cannot be verified empirically but can be explored through
comparing alternative approaches to see what approach yields great-
est accuracy at least cost.60 Burton says his prescription beats Schwartz
and Scott on these terms.61 He contrasts them with the contextualism
associated with Corbin and Traynor.62 Burton says these two made the
purpose discovering subjectively intended meanings whenever possi-
ble, supposedly enabled by admitting more evidence—a weak parol
56 Bowers, supra note 42, at 590 n.11. R
57 Burton, supra note 45, at 341. R
58 Id. at 347.
59 Id. at 359; see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Models and Games: The Difference Between
Explanation and Understanding for Lawyers and Ethicists, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613, 643 (2008)
(“The model is based on a number of assumptions about the way firms do business that are open
to debate.”); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illu-
sions of Intention, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 99, 104 (2005) (invoking philosophy of language to challenge
assumption that if words had a given meaning at time of contract formation any later attempt to
offer a different meaning is opportunistic).
60 See Burton, supra note 45, at 352–54. R
61 Id.
62 Id. at 352.
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evidence rule, no four corners rule, and skepticism of plain meaning.63
So contextualism is costly.
Burton offers something in between, which he calls “objective
contextual interpretation.”64 It blends the defense Schwartz and Scott
offered on the one hand and Corbin et al. on the other by admitting
more evidence than Schwartz and Scott but less than Corbin. For ex-
ample, it might include this evidence: the whole document, the con-
tract’s purpose, the objective setting at contract formation, trade
usage, and course of performance; but exclude what he says is “famil-
iar contextualism” evidence, such as negotiating history, course of
dealing, and subjective party testimony.65 While Burton thus pushes a
form of “doctrinal hybridization,” blending Corbin and Williston, it
remains singular in approach.66
Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott recently reflected on rising
appetite for what might be called a situational compromise—literalism
for contracts among legal sophisticates and contextualism for nov-
ices.67 This is an important step in the literature, though they pause
ahead of taking that normative leap to lament the prevailing state of
debate. Citing Llewellyn and Traynor, they perceive contextualism to
have greatest appeal for settings involving consumers in mass markets
or inexperienced businesspeople.68 There, “powerful intuitions” may
warrant probing context to uncover party intention through more evi-
dence.69 In contrast, textualism draws the line at legally sophisticated
parties, who prefer the regime that follows their instructions.70 For so-
phisticated parties and “bespoke” contracts, they say, “context is
endogenous.”71
In their bespoke contracts, sophisticated parties can include as
much or as little context as they wish. The great strength of this free-
dom is empowering people along with reducing the costs of con-
tracting and dispute resolution. Relatedly, this regime “creates an
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 353.
66 See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION ch. 6
(2009). The principal arguments favoring Burton’s approach are the fiendish elusiveness of the
concept of subjective intent and the value of enabling nonparties to rely on the written word of
others’ contracts without probing mental states or bargaining contexts.
67 Gilson et al., supra note 41, at 26–27. R
68 Id. at 38–39.
69 Id. at 39.
70 Id. at 40.
71 Id.
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incentive to draft carefully.”72 Gilson et al. stress that, at least when
“uncertainty is low and risks can be allocated in advance,” many so-
phisticated parties will prefer formalist interpretation and will “ration-
ally invest” enough in drafting so courts arrive at the “‘correct
interpretation’ more often than not.”73
Yet while rightly clarifying how the competing schools offer dif-
ferent tools suitable for different jobs—and probably deflecting criti-
cism about being right “on average”—the authors make three
observations about the lamentable state of debate. First, they identify
a “deep puzzle”—since the rival models seem to apply to two differ-
ent prototypes, why the debate for supremacy?74 The answer they dis-
cern: a “shared presumption of the unitary nature of contract law and
the mandatory nature of interpretation doctrine.”75 But while too
many do indeed say any judicial choice in one case applies to all cases,
one lesson from the debate and the cases, increasingly accepted on
both sides, is that different settings warrant different tools.
Nevertheless, the authors note a second regrettable implication of
the prevailing debate, which is that in addition to being binary, it is
“winner-take-all.”76 Again, this is neither inevitable nor desirable, as a
proper debate would arrive at whatever “winnings” are sustained by
the evidence and logic. The authors’ third lament is most provocative:
an important difference between the two approaches, they write, is
that contextualism is more “imperialist.”77 In other words, contextual-
ism rejects textualism, whereas textualism accepts contextualism by
embedding context in contract design.
Many contextualists are sensitive to such critiques, such as Pro-
fessor Shawn Bayern, who says that contextualists are textualists when
warranted.78 Bayern laments “little agreement” among U.S. scholars
on contract interpretation, but attributes this to polarity between
those who crave justice in particular cases (tending toward subjective
intent based on abundant evidence) versus aspirants for general effi-
ciency (objective manifestations discerned from texts).79 But beware
the false choice, as contextualism can promote efficiency too, and tex-
72 Id. at 41.
73 Id. at 42.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 43.
77 Id.
78 Shawn Bayern, Contract Meta-Interpretation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1097, 1100–01
(2016).
79 Id. at 1099.
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tualism may often be the correct interpretive tool in light of context.80
For instance, enforcing a notice deadline missed by ten minutes might
seem harsh, but if context reveals a volatile market setting then a liter-
alist insistence on the deadline is apt: contextualism leads to
textualism.81
Professors Peter Gerhart and Juliet Kostritsky recently offered a
more emphatic example of hybridization that rejects the “false
choice” of textualism versus contextualism.82 They note that parties to
contracts have different interests and preferences and that, while both
may wish to minimize contracting costs, they assess costs and related
trade-offs differently.83 So the notion of an intention of “the parties” is
elusive.84 It is therefore futile to search for ultimate intent but impor-
tant to find shared meaning.85 While the model they propose for doing
this is complex, in essence it is designed to put before judges enough
information, as they pithily put it, to “avoid the problems of textual-
ism (which can make easy cases difficult) and anything-goes contextu-
alism (which can make difficult cases unmanageable).”86
Finally, consider recent calls for an enlarged textualism—one
even more liberal than Corbin: admitting evidence of transactional
circumstances to probe the genuineness of assent. While on its surface
this sounds like an “anything-goes” contextualism, in fact proponents
implicitly focus on the setting that Gilson et al. say is ripe for contex-
tualism—whether subjective intent is in doubt despite objective mani-
festations. Professor Larry DiMatteo and Dean Blake Morant, for
instance, advocate such an approach for consumers as well as small
businesses.87 Within that domain, moreover, the contextual probe is
80 Bayern stresses a preliminary question, whether parties intended a textualist or contex-
tualist approach, and argues that courts should—and many do—discern this intention using a
contextualist approach. Id. at 1102.
81 See, e.g., Arcos Ltd. v. E.A. Ronaasen & Son [1933] AC 470 (HL) 474 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (rejecting argument that goods commercially equivalent to those allowed in the con-
tract must be accepted, even though they are commercially equivalent, because the goods were
slightly larger than allowed for in the contract language and the contract did not leave room for
ambiguity).
82 Peter M. Gerhart & Juliet P. Kostritsky, Efficient Contextualism, 76 U. PITT. L. REV.
509, 509 (2015).
83 Id. at 512.
84 Id. at 567.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 509.
87 See Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contract in Context and Contract as Con-
text, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 564–65 (2010); Blake D. Morant, Contractual Interpretation
in the Commercial Context, in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PER-
SPECTIVES 248, 262 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg eds., 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-6\GWN604.txt unknown Seq: 16 27-FEB-18 10:50
1640 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1625
on a specific set of problems less likely to afflict legal sophisticates for
whom Gilson et al. advocate formalism, to wit, “subjective factors re-
lated to power, class, gender, or race.”88
Despite the seemingly wide gap between Morant and Scott—
Morant’s teacher—Gilson is right that textualists and contextualists
are looking at two different problems. And neither is inherently more
imperialist than the other—textualists can be contextual at least by
accepting context when parties direct context, and contextualists can
be textualists at least when the context so dictates, which may include
the prototypical settings of legally sophisticated parties.
On the other hand, contextualists who exert contextualism de-
spite party intentions—such as Traynor’s strained view of what an in-
demnity clause means—may indeed be guilty of imperialism as Gilson
et al. charge.89 Likewise, formalist prescriptions of slavish adherence
to party intent may also go too far. After all, it is often difficult to
specify the exact evidence and interpretive rules ahead of time, and
not all judges are as error-prone as strict formalists may fear.
All would do well to follow the example of recent scholarship—
including that of Scott and his colleagues—pursuing compromise that
breaks the stubborn binary tradition. In this terrain, debate will ad-
dress what factors determine which regime to apply, including above
all the relative roles to be played by parties ex ante or judges ex post.
Much of the scholarship reviewed above laid the groundwork for this
stage of debate, and the pieces highlighted in the next Section con-
sciously cultivate this direction.
B. Breaking the Stubborn Binary
As early as 2009, Professor Adam Badawi presciently noted that
the efficiency arguments championed for formalist interpretation can
likewise be marshalled on behalf of the contextualist approach.90 The
issue ultimately is party ability to draft relatively more or less com-
pletely, as that will determine which approach they prefer, Badawi
says.91 Low drafting costs promote completeness and presumably for-
malist appetites whereas high drafting costs might stimulate a more
contextualist taste.92 Sometimes the latter approach is more cost effec-
88 Morant, supra note 87, at 262. R
89 Gilson et al., supra note 41, at 43. R
90 Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2009).
91 Id. at 28–31.
92 Id. at 48–54.
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tive.93 This perspective helps explain some observed phenomena, such
as a pro-formal propensity of grain, cotton, and diamond merchants
and the more context-hungry deals in construction, software develop-
ment, and mergers.
Badawi develops a model of choice of interpretive regimes ac-
cording to diverse settings driving alternatives.94 Many businesses may
favor formalism as Schwartz and Scott contend, but not all, and not
for every contract they make. Preferences depend on factors such as
transaction type, drafting costs, and capacity to be relatively complete.
Badawi suspects that formalism is preferred for deals that are fre-
quent and certain, the optimal conditions for complete contracts, like
the setting of high-frequency commodity contracts.95 But deals that
are “infrequent, uncertain, and high-stakes” may point to contextual
interpretation, whether one-shot or relational, Badawi says.96
Professor Scott, more than a decade ago, observed that half the
population is motivated by a reciprocity norm of fairness.97 Courts
often invoke indefiniteness to refuse contract enforcement, he ob-
served, and so wondered why parties might deliberately leave their
contracts incomplete, especially since it is relatively cheap, particu-
larly for the legally sophisticated, to condition performance in various
ways or provide references to constrain discretion.98 A compelling ex-
planation in many cases is a common norm—a “taste for reciprocal
fairness” creates conditions for self-enforcing contracts, which may
also be efficient, Scott theorized.99
More recently, Professor Wendy Netter Epstein marshalled a
body of experimental evidence on the relevance of such norms of reci-
procity and trust for certain categories of contracts. She criticizes pre-
vailing doctrine (such as definiteness), and both sides of the
interpretation debate, for encouraging excessive contract specificity in
contexts where greater flexibility is more valuable.100 Research she as-
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 5–6.
96 Id. at 6.
97 Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1641, 1644 (2003).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1683; see also Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source
of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 778 (2010) (“[S]trategic ambiguity in the joint
venture agreement may provide incentive for greater cooperation and at the same time may
amplify the perception of shared risks.”).
100 Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297
(2014).
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sembles cautions that high contract detail impairs autonomy, which
can reduce trust, undermine reciprocity, and stifle motivation and in-
novation.101 In settings where those goals are valuable, the business
content and legal treatment of contracts should be more flexible.102
The costs can be acute for contracts involving principal-agent re-
lationships entailing effort and cooperation. Applying formalist tech-
niques to trust-laden settings produces direct costs of increased
specificity during negotiation and drafting plus impaired trust that
often results. “Control-based contracting,” as Epstein calls it, stimu-
lates checking and meeting requirements rather than satisfying the
spirit of a deal.103 Reposing some measure of discretion, in contrast,
stimulates trust and positive reciprocity.104
In short, echoing Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, determining the right
interpretative tool for the job is to a large degree a question of con-
tract design.105 If so, certain settings—Epstein says those characterized
by complexity, uncertainty, limited market incentives, need for coop-
eration, and an appetite for innovation—warrant a more dynamic in-
terpretation.106 Then evidence of intention draws on both text and
context—both pre- and post-contractual, meaning potentially course
of dealing, negotiation history, and course of performance.107
In other work, Gilson et al. address the concern that excessive
formalism can crowd out such desirable norms, which they argue over-
looks how formal and informal contracting are complements, not sub-
stitutes.108 Likewise informed by the growing experimental literature,
and illustrated by real-world contracts, they explore how practice does
both: dealing with uncertainty through a combination of formal articu-
101 Id. at 310.
102 Id. at 332.
103 Id. at 300.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 309 n.49.
106 Id. In certain settings, Epstein prescribes greater formality, especially if compliance is
the primary goal and concerning the price term in medical services contracts. See Wendy Netter
Epstein, Revisiting Incentive-Based Contracts, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2017);
Wendy Netter Epstein, Price Transparency and Incomplete Contracts in Health Care (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author).
107 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1743, 1770 (2000) (“[M]odern contract law has appropriately moved from a static concep-
tion of interpretation, that tended to focus on the text as of the moment of contract formation, to
a dynamic conception, that encompasses events before and after that moment. To put this differ-
ently, under modern contract law the text of a contract runs through time.”).
108 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of For-
mal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1377
(2010).
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lation and informal mechanisms.109 The combination facilitates mutual
assessment of performance, not solely for adherence to the formal
standards but for a propensity toward cooperation and collaboration
in response to new developments.110
As an example, formal contracts call for sharing information on
progress and prospects which, in turn, builds a culture of reciprocity
and trust on which the parties proceed. Rather than formal contract
crowding out informal norms, the two features complement each
other. The insight is readily applicable to recurring contract law de-
bates such as when preliminary negotiations and letters of intent
should become binding—the model suggests later rather than ear-
lier—and the related notion of good faith—courts should be more
temperate in imposing any duties to negotiate in good faith. But for
this Essay’s purpose, the broader point is how this work productively
illustrates hybridization of two lines of thought.
Further strides can be seen as law draws on more disciplines for
illumination—beyond both economics and linguistics—to what people
making contracts actually think about what they are doing. Professor
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan explores the concept of the “psychological con-
tract,” which stresses both the importance and predictability of the
subjective, idiosyncratic understandings that people have of their con-
tractual obligations.111 Specifically, those understandings of duty are
not fully captured by either the text that formalists centralize or even
much of the background law and context that contextualists pursue.
Rather, there are subjective states of expectation that are inde-
pendent of contract law’s default rules: people don’t know what those
default rules are.112 On the other hand, they routinely accept that their
duties include a general moral and social obligation of trust and reci-
procity. They also “incorporate relationship-specific informal norms
and agreements into the psychological contract, even when . . .
outside, or even in conflict with, the explicit provisions.”113 Few judges
and scholars in the textualist-contextualist debate seem to be attuned
to these realities.
109 Id.
110 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation:
Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009).
111 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 843, 843 (2012).
112 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPU-
LAR CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER 2–3, 239 (2d ed. 2016).
113 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 111, at 845–46. R
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Finally, in recent research Professor Cathy Hwang explored the
phenomenon of unbundling—deals involving multiple written agree-
ments, such as corporate mergers or acquisitions consummated using
one principal agreement along with numerous ancillary ones, gov-
erning employment, transition services, and intellectual property.114
Such a modular approach improves the quality of each with related
negotiation and drafting conducted by subgroups of relevant princi-
pals and professionals.115 Yet such unbundling poses challenges for
conventional debate between textualists and contextualists. For one, is
each agreement to be taken literally on its own or is each a part of the
text for all other parts of the transaction? Hwang’s insights point to
the rationality of applying different interpretive techniques to differ-
ent kinds of agreements—what is good for the merger agreement may
not be good for the employment contract.116
Professor Jeffrey Lipshaw, who practiced corporate contracting
for several decades at the highest levels before entering teaching, of-
fers the following wise insight that supports being skeptical of textual-
ists and contextualists alike:
Most business agreements worth litigating over were, at the
time of their creation, a complex synergy of individual inten-
tions and motivations, more or less complete communica-
tions, drafting practices, pressures, and deadlines, many of
which propelled the contract to its execution as a thing, a
deed, or an event, and not necessarily as a logical and coher-
ent text. In contrast, merely focusing after-the-fact on the
logic and coherence of the text is, as often as not, an econo-
mist’s simplification, a moralist’s ideal, or a lawyer’s
delusion.117
III. BERKSHIRE’S CONTRACTS
Warren Buffett, head of Berkshire Hathaway, famously criticizes
excessively detailed contracts over which lawyers labor as wordsmiths;
he prefers informality, including handshakes, “gentlemen’s” agree-
114 Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers
and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (2016).
115 Id. at 1417.
116 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2009) (noting that sophisticated parties sometimes bifur-
cate promises between those enforceable by courts as contracts and those stating relational
terms lacking such judicial recognition).
117 Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Lexical Opportunism and the Limits of Contract Theory, 84 U. CIN.
L. REV. 217, 219–20 (2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-6\GWN604.txt unknown Seq: 21 27-FEB-18 10:50
2017] CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 2.0 1645
ments, oral promises, and agreements he personally drafts.118 Yet
Berkshire has also executed highly stylized, lengthy, and technical
agreements laden with legalese, boilerplate, and heavily negotiated
terms. When using outside deal counsel, Berkshire always uses the
same firm, Munger, Tolles & Olson, founded by Berkshire Vice-Chair-
man Charlie Munger.
Buffett’s aversion to legalistic contracting is due in part to his fru-
gality—he would rather do most things himself because it is cheaper—
and in part to appreciating that rule-based contracting can convey
mistrust and therefore destroy trust rather than build it. He is espe-
cially content with trust-based arrangements when he has a preexist-
ing trust-based relationship but there are examples of both (1) trust-
based deals without prior relationships (including a highly informal
publishing arrangement with the author of this Essay)119 and (2) rule-
based deals involving friends (highlighted by an excruciatingly de-
tailed asset purchase agreement between Berkshire, The Washington
Post Co., and Buffett’s long-time close personal friend Don
Graham).120
In general, during the company’s earliest years, when smaller and
simpler, its contracts, even its acquisition agreements, were informal;
in more recent years, as the company grew in scale and complexity,
the acquisition agreements assumed greater formality. Amid such a
variety of contracts, there seems little doubt that not all will be best
understood using the single approach of formalism or the single ap-
proach of contextualism. Rather, as a review of some Berkshire con-
tracts—informal and formal—will show, contract design varies and so
too should contract interpretation.
A. Informal Promises Repeated for Decades
Begin with two of the most famous of the many informal
promises Buffett has made repeatedly since taking control of Berk-
shire fifty years ago. The first concerns his regular declaration that he
regards Berkshire as a partnership, not a corporation, among him,
Munger, and all other shareholders. This conception is the first of a
dozen operating principles Berkshire publishes in its annual reports,
118 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Disintermediation: A Managerial
Model for the Next Generation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (2015).
119 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR
CORPORATE AMERICA (4th ed. 2015).
120 LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT 176 (2014).
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dating to the mid-1980s and included in every one since 1995.121 If
there is a partnership, then Buffett’s fiduciary duties are more de-
manding than for corporate directors. If taken literally—in their plain
meaning and without admitting extrinsic evidence—these statements
suffice to form a partnership.122 But in context, they are aspirational
statements of business philosophy to convey a conviction that share-
holders are owners along with Buffett. No one has sued Buffett over
this—and no such claim is imaginable given Buffett’s probable dis-
charge of a partnership duty—but it illustrates the limits of literalism.
Second, for forty years, Buffett has repeatedly declared, in offi-
cial Berkshire documents and in presentations and commentary, that
when Berkshire acquires a company, it intends to hold it forever, not
sell.123 And he has made good on that promise, retaining even compa-
nies that struggle financially. Berkshire makes this specific point in
acquisition discussions and it is often a basic rationale for many sellers
to Berkshire, especially families and entrepreneurs, who value the
commitment of permanence. But no such promises appear in the for-
mal acquisition agreements Berkshire signs. That makes sense be-
cause an intention, backed by practice, is probably all that can
realistically be given and provides the seller a sufficient basis to pro-
ceed. A formalist interpretation of such texts would bar admitting
such statements, practices, or rationales, deemed discharged by the
parol evidence rule. Again, there has never been a breach of such a
promise so it has not been tested in court, but this illustrates the ap-
peal of formalism.
B. Early Major Informal Acquisition Agreements
Now take two quotes from a pair of Buffett’s recent chairman’s
letters to Berkshire shareholders about some of its earliest acquisition
agreements. While both are from the corporate field of acquisitions,
long known for a high degree of stylized legalistic formality, both also
involve personal characteristics that warranted a different touch: one
121 See, e.g., BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 108 (2017) (“Although
our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our sharehold-
ers as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners.”).
122 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE BUFFETT ESSAYS SYMPOSIUM 20 (2016) (collo-
quy between Professor Edmund Kitch and Mr. Buffett).
123 E.g., Anthony Bianco, The Warren Buffet You Don’t Know, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 1999,
12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1999-07-04/the-warren-buffett-you-dont-
know (“We buy everything, even a stock, with the idea that we will hold it forever.”); see, e.g.,
Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire
Hathaway Inc. (1988), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1988.html [https://perma.cc/
CZ2P-RDY6].
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selling group was a family and the other a friend of Buffett’s. The first
describes one of Berkshire’s earliest—and still historically most im-
portant—acquisitions in terms of size: the 1967 purchase of National
Indemnity Company (“NICO”), which today is the largest insurance
company in the world.
[Insurance] has been the engine that has propelled our ex-
pansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity
and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 mil-
lion. Though that purchase had monumental consequences
for Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.
Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling
shareholder of the two companies, came to my office saying
he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes later, we had a deal.
Neither of Jack’s companies had ever had an audit by a pub-
lic accounting firm, and I didn’t ask for one. My reasoning:
(1) Jack was honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and
likely to walk away if the deal became at all complicated.
[The purchase agreement we used to finalize the trans-
action was 11/2 pages long.] That contract was homemade:
Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has to be Berk-
shire’s best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (gen-
erally accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111
billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the
world.124
The second informal Berkshire acquisition agreement describes
one of the company’s earliest family-business acquisitions—likewise
among the most important for establishing Berkshire’s trust-based ap-
proach to its long-term business relationships. The deal is the 1983
purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”) then owned by the
Blumkin family.
I went to see Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), carrying a 11/4-page
purchase proposal for NFM that I had drafted. . . . Mrs. B
accepted my offer without changing a word, and we com-
pleted the deal without the involvement of investment bank-
ers or lawyers (an experience that can only be described as
heavenly). Though the company’s financial statements were
unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B simply told me what was
what, and her word was good enough for me.125
124 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2015) (Chairman’s Letter); see
also id. at 128–29 (excerpting the National Indemnity contract).
125 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2014) (Chairman’s Letter); see
also id. at 114–15 (excerpting the Nebraska Furniture Mart contract).
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Both of these early informal contracts referenced the company’s
financial statements—in NICO’s case, its balance sheets and income
statements represented to be fairly presented,126 and in NFM’s case,
its income tax returns, and incorporated accounting data, to be certi-
fied at closing as fairly presented.127 But suppose there was some vari-
ation in fact. How would a judge determine whether the variation
violated the representations? In NFM’s case, there are differences be-
tween tax accounting and financial accounting that make it difficult to
interpret the representation using the plain meaning rule. Some con-
text seems required.
Compare both of these informal agreements with the dozen or so
more recent Berkshire acquisitions of large publicly traded companies
where each makes financial statement representations elaborated in
great detail in the pattern more familiar to sophisticated merger
agreements.128 They explicitly reference arcane points, such as encom-
passing notes to the financial statements and the schedules to SEC
filings, and delineate inclusion, as of multiple periods and specified
dates, of the balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow state-
ment. They invoke generally accepted accounting principles in the
United States. Such exquisitely delineated detail is almost certainly
negotiated and drafted in the expectation that the words will be taken
at face value. Context matters and sometimes that means the plain
meaning rule.
C. Unbundled Agreements
Two subsequent Berkshire transactions illustrate the unbundled
nature of corporate acquisition agreements, in which a formal stylized
merger agreement is accompanied by ancillary agreements concerning
matters such as employment. The first concerned The Scott Fetzer
Companies in 1985.129 Berkshire was a white knight amid hostile take-
over overtures that put Scott Fetzer “in play.” The merger agreement,
signed for Berkshire by Munger and probably written by him at least
in part, spanned just four pages when first executed and only eight
pages upon being amended and restated in final form—about twenty
percent the average length of contemporary merger agreements.130
126 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., supra note 124, at 128. R
127 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., supra note 125, at 114. R
128 For a list of recent Berkshire acquisitions, see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 120, at 135–36. R
129 See Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger Dated November 26, 1985
Among Berkshire Hathaway Inc., BHI Acuisition, Inc. and The Scott & Fetzer Company [here-
inafter Scott Fetzer Agreement] (on file with author).
130 This inference is based on merger agreement length data from 1994 and in consultation
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Among a few simple representations was the central one concern-
ing SEC filings and financial statements, and among a few contingen-
cies was a supermajority shareholder approval requirement (two-
thirds instead of the majority state law required).131 There is both a
no-talk clause (without any fiduciary out) and a best efforts clause,
which has an additional novelty: after requiring a Scott Fetzer share-
holder vote, it provides that if the two-thirds vote is not received,
Scott Fetzer would call a second meeting the next quarter and “pro-
ceed with extraordinary diligence to solicit proxies.”132 The contract
then explains:
The purpose of the two-possible-stockholder-solicitations
procedure . . . is (i) to cause the first (and probably only)
solicitation to be scheduled early to facilitate early payment
of merger proceeds to Scott Fetzer shareholders and (ii) to
assure that Parent, an extremely creditworthy and responsi-
ble corporation which is committed to the proposed merger
with minimal contingencies, for the benefit of Scott Fetzer’s
shareholders, will remain committed to the Merger for an ex-
tended period of time and will receive for its benefit in ex-
change for its commitment, a very thorough consideration of
the terms of the proposed transaction by Scott Fetzer share-
holders, the mutual commitments being deemed reasonable
because the Agreement is submitted to an inherently de-
manding test of approval by two-thirds of Scott Fetzer shares
outstanding.133
The brevity, novelty, and clarity of this agreement distinguishes it
from many others and reflects a sophistication that would warrant
judges interpreting the contract literally in many places but contextu-
ally in others. And the contract explained itself—the statement of pur-
pose does not contain any obligation but aids in understanding the
duty to call a revote and act with extraordinary diligence.134 Purpose is
one quest of contextualist interpretation, which this contract provides
on its face, illustrating how parties can put as much or as little context
in their writings as they wish.
with Professor Jeffrey Manns, who has performed data analyses on merger agreements. See Jef-
frey Manns & Robert Anderson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1143
(2013).
131 See Scott Fetzer Agreement, supra note 129, §§ 3.1(d), 3.2(c), 4.2. R
132 See id. §§ 4.2, 4.7.
133 Id. § 4.2.
134 See id.
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As to the best efforts clause, should a fiduciary out be read into
it? The text plainly does not contemplate that, but the two-thirds vote
and the explanatory paragraph may warrant permitting the board
some leeway, whether or not strictly required by law. On the other
hand, the context is important: this is a white knight acquisition com-
peting with contending hostile bids the Scott Fetzer board was deter-
mined to resist. Scott Fetzer and Berkshire both likely preferred the
tightest possible clause. Again, a contextualist approach may result in
a literalist reading.
The Scott Fetzer acquisition agreement also called for Berkshire
to honor the seller’s existing senior executive employment agree-
ments.135 On this point, Berkshire made a separate employment con-
tract with the CEO, Ralph Schey, about which Buffett wrote in his
chairman’s letter to Berkshire shareholders a few years later:
[O]ur compensation arrangement with Ralph Schey was
worked out in about five minutes, immediately upon our
purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the “help” of lawyers
or compensation consultants. This arrangement embodies a
few very simple ideas—not the kind of terms favored by con-
sultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have
established that you have a large problem (and one, of
course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with
Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to
me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation ar-
rangements with the managers of all our other units are simi-
larly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary to fit
the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the exis-
tence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by man-
agers, etc.136
We therefore have two very different kinds of agreements: a for-
mal merger agreement (if an unusually short one) and an informal
employment agreement (though obviously containing the key com-
pensation terms). For good reason: the merger agreement serves a
specific discrete and temporary one-off function—the Scott Fetzer
board getting the Scott Fetzer shareholders to approve the merger so
that it can be closed with ownership acquired. While a degree of trust
is important, and the fewer provisions the better, it is easy to zero in
135 See id. § 4.4.
136 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 73 (1995) (Chairman’s Letter), as
reprinted in CUNNINGHAM, supra note 119, at 73–74. R
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with maximal detail on exactly what is vital without addressing any-
thing else.
In contrast, the employment agreement addresses an ongoing
working relationship of indefinite duration—it lasted fourteen years
through Schey’s retirement at seventy-five. While compensation and
incentives are important, it is hard to say what will matter most.
Hence the common use of open-ended best efforts clauses in employ-
ment contracts. To repeat, if formalism is good for the merger agree-
ment, contextualism can be better for the employment contract.
For the second example, Berkshire usually carries over incum-
bent managers’ contracts upon acquisition—and some are elaborate.
Take that of David Sokol, head of MidAmerican Energy when Berk-
shire acquired it in 2000.137 The contract is fifteen single-spaced pages
with great detail, including intricate treatment of termination.138
Sokol was among Berkshire’s most visible subsidiary CEOs and
widely seen as Buffett’s successor.139 Yet in 2011, he embroiled Berk-
shire in controversy by front running—buying stock in a company
before pitching it to Buffett as an acquisition target.140 The contract
was pivotal because it restricted the company’s termination right
under a tight definition of “cause.”141
The definition runs 267 words; sub-defines concepts like “willful”;
sets qualifications like gross misconduct and demonstrable injury; and
requires advance warning of deficiencies and passage of a board reso-
lution meeting stated criteria.142 For an executive in trouble, this pro-
vides strict, plain parameters; a court need not even look up willful in
a law dictionary.
But suppose an executive gets in trouble under a vague approach
like Schey’s contract. It sets a term, so something like cause is needed
to terminate. But exactly what depends on both general legal defini-
tions and the specifics of the deal.
Presumably front running would qualify, so Sokol would have
been out under the Schey contract; under his actual contract, Berk-
shire’s termination was more difficult. Sokol’s lawyer even claimed
the agreement permitted front running.143 In the end, Berkshire fol-
137 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 120, at 132–33. R
138 See MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., Amended and Restated Employment Agree-
ment (Feb. 25, 2008) (on file with The George Washington Law Review).
139 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 120, at 113. R
140 Id. at 113–14.
141 See MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., supra note 138, at 6, 12. R
142 Id.
143 Ben Protess & Peter Lattman, Sokol Is Accused of Misleading Buffett on Trades, N.Y.
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lowed the procedures and terminated Sokol—but clearly these formal
provisions were for his benefit, not theirs.
D. The Spirit and the Letter
At stake in the degree of formality or informality used in creat-
ing—and interpreting—contracts is what matters more: the letter or
the spirit of agreement. On this issue, another pair of Berkshire con-
tracts illustrates how an informal promise has been observed most sol-
emnly while a formal one has been honored quite conditionally. In
each example, Berkshire acquired a public company with a family-
held bloc concerned with aspects of history or operations: in 2000, the
paint manufacturer Benjamin Moore & Co., which had a longstanding
commitment to an independent distributor model rather than using
big box retailers, and in 2013, H.J. Heinz Company, the condiment
maker, with an abiding loyalty to its hometown community of
Pittsburgh.144
With Benjamin Moore, several contracts were signed, including a
formal merger agreement and a shareholders’ agreement committing
Moore family members and other insiders to the transaction. All par-
ticipants appreciated the centrality of the independent distributor sys-
tem to the company as related public disclosure made plain.145 Yet the
formal agreements contained no related promises. Shortly after clos-
ing, however, hearing concerns from distributors about continuity,
Buffett made a video in which he expressly promised to maintain the
system and not sell through big box retailers.146 When successive
CEOs at Moore signaled willingness to break that promise out of busi-
ness necessity, Buffett would remove them, putting his commitment to
the distributors first.147
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011, 4:18 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/berkshire-releases-re-
port-on-sokol/.
144 See infra notes 145, 148. R
145 See, e.g., Offer to Purchase for Cash All Outstanding Shares of Common Stock of Ben-
jamin Moore & Co. at $37.82 Net Per Share by B Acquisition, Inc. (Nov. 17, 2000) (on file with
The George Washington Law Review) (“The Company substantially relies on independent deal-
ers for distribution of its architecture products which provide the majority of the Company’s
revenue and profits. This network consists of more than 3,700 retailers with more than 4,700
storefronts in the U.S. and Canada.”); Press Release, Benjamin Moore to Be Acquired by Berk-
shire Hathaway (Nov. 8, 2000), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/nov0800.html (“Head-
quartered in Montvale, New Jersey, Benjamin Moore’s products are distributed throughout
North America through a network of authorized dealers.”).
146 Colleen Leahey, The Wrath of Warren Buffett: How Benjamin Moore Almost Broke His
Promise, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2014 6:45 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/17/warren-buffett-ben-
jamin-moore/.
147 Id.; see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 120, at 66–67. R
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In Heinz, the merger agreement devoted an entire section to the
company’s cultural connection to Pittsburgh. It declared that “after
the Closing, the Company’s current headquarters in Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania will be the Surviving Corporation’s headquarters.”148 A cove-
nant, which survives the closing and was made by the acquisition
subsidiary Berkshire jointly owned (called the “Parent”), promises:
“[A]fter the Closing, Parent shall cause the Surviving Corporation to
preserve the Company’s heritage and continue to support philan-
thropic and charitable causes in Pittsburgh.”149 The contract refer-
enced the company’s contractual right to name Pittsburgh’s
professional athletic stadium, called Heinz Field, and required keep-
ing that name.150 The contract required the parties to reference these
commitments in their press releases about the deal.151
But within a year of the Heinz deal, the company, led by manag-
ers appointed by Berkshire’s co-acquirer, 3G, cut more than 300 jobs
at Pittsburgh headquarters.152 A further Pittsburgh dilution occurred
soon thereafter, when Heinz merged with Chicago-based Kraft to
form The Kraft Heinz Company. While the company adopted dual
headquarters and asserted it was keeping its Pittsburgh covenants, lo-
cals perceived a hollowing out and migration to Chicago.153 The ac-
tions may not have violated the covenants but the reasonable
questions mark the contrast with Moore: there a most informal prom-
ise is honored with spirited punctiliousness while here a highly formal-
ized one is more technically managed.
What of enforcement? In Moore, a contextualist likely would say
the distributors can enforce Buffett’s promise. For one, the promise is
not in writing but by video, so the parol evidence rule doesn’t apply to
prevent absorbing all circumstances.154 Amid known distributor cen-
trality and concerns, express promises are made directly to distribu-
148 Agreement and Plan of Merger by and Among H.J. Heinz Co. and Hawk Acquisition





152 See James R. Hagerty, In Kraft-Heinz Deal, Will Chicago or Pittsburgh Lose More Jobs?
Tussle to Retain Positions Likely to Emerge Between Hometowns of Packaged-Food Giants,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-kraft-heinz-deal-will-chicago-or-
pittsburgh-lose-more-jobs-1427308717.
153 See Jessica Wohl & Greg Trotter, Kraft Heinz Headquarters to Move to Chicago, CHI.
TRIB. (July 17, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-kraft-heinz-chicago-headquar-
ters-0717-biz-20150716-story.html.
154 See Leahey, supra note 146. R
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tors who, if induced to remain, give consideration or at the very least
foreseeably rely.155 A formalist might get hung up on the exact words
Buffett uttered to test for promissory commitment, press on whether
such a promise requires Berkshire board approval, or even ask
whether it must be in writing under the one-year clause of the statute
of frauds.
In Heinz, a textualist might observe that the language is less pre-
cise or ironclad than one might expect of a long-term corporate prom-
ise. For instance, there’s no time frame (just repeatedly saying from
and after “Closing”) or benchmarks (only vague references to pre-
serving “heritage” and supporting charities).156
For another, the promises are made by the buyer which, upon
closing, owns the seller, and will not sue itself for breach. The agree-
ment disclaims third party enforcement rights other than stated ex-
ceptions such as option holders and personnel covered by
indemnification.157 There is no mention of, say, Pittsburgh headquar-
ters’ personnel, Pittsburgh charities, or the Heinz family. As a formal
matter, it seems there is either no promise at all or at best a promise
without a plaintiff.
What might contextualism prescribe? To Buffett and other devo-
tees of informal, trust-based relations, the agreement memorializes a
commitment—with imprecision understandable given the context. A
court could declare conflict between the Pittsburgh promises and the
third party beneficiary clause and admit extrinsic evidence to deter-
mine intention. It might ask whether it is plausible to believe that the
Pittsburgh promises were only included as a publicity stunt. If so, the
clause is deceptive, and if that is troubling, granting standing to Pitts-
burgh interests could be appropriate.
The Heinz merger agreement says it is governed by Delaware law
or by Pennsylvania law, Heinz’s state of incorporation, to the extent
its law is mandatory.158 Which way a court comes out, however, de-
pends not on whether those states are listed as contextualist by Corbin
or formalist by Scott—and we saw that both claim Pennsylvania—but
on which tool seems better for the task.
In the circumstances, the Moore promise seems more an avuncu-
lar assurance of intention than a contractual commitment—much like
155 See id.
156 See Heinz Agreement, supra note 148, § 7.15. R
157 See id. § 10.09.
158 Id. § 10.05.
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Buffett’s vows of permanence, which he also uttered in the video.159
Heinz likewise may well involve an expression of “intent for the time
being,” statements of business conviction rather than legal covenant—
much like Buffett’s vows of Berkshire as a partnership.
But this complexity shows that it would be desirable to develop a
body of literature that provides guidance to courts in choosing the
right tool for the job rather than continuing the binary debate. And
that is the budding trend the scholarship illustrates, which hopefully
will be nurtured.
E. Coda
If scholars have paid insufficient attention to what judges do—
arguing the superiority of a single tool when judges use multiple varia-
tions—judges may pay too little attention to what recent scholarship
offers: guidance on how to select the right tool for the job, which in-
cludes ascertaining the reasons why parties chose given contractual
forms.
The illustrations in this Part—Buffett’s informal promises of part-
nership and permanence; purchases of NICO and NFM; takeovers
and employment agreements such as Scott Fetzer or David Sokol; and
other assurances amid merger, from Benjamin Moore and H.J.
Heinz—illustrate that many factors influence contract design.
Courts would do well to think about that when selecting appro-
priate tools for the interpretation job. They can draw on the rich
scholarship canvassed in the previous Section, especially work point-
ing towards hybridization. At the very least, the Berkshire examples
show that adopting a highly formal, delineated, bargained-for ex-
change manifests an upfront investment that warrants back-end defer-
ence and at least a presumption of formalist interpretation; adopting
looser, flexible, underspecified terms signals the opposite and war-
rants the opposite presumption.
CONCLUSION
The history of contract interpretation in the United States is
largely formalist, punctuated by occasional disruptions (Traynor in
PG&E, 1968), trends (1990s), and tributaries (U.C.C.) that are more
realistic and contextual. The American story of contract interpretation
is one of the minority of contract doctrines where formalism survived
159 Leahey, supra note 146. R
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the realist critique. And despite the realist trend that percolated dur-
ing the 1990s, it soon was checked by a formalist renewal.
Meanwhile, scholarship has historically positioned debate in bi-
nary, winner-take-all terms, where either formalism or contextualism
is generally superior and therefore the designated default rule. But
recent strands of scholarship suggest awakening to a new horizon, in
which there is no one-size-fits-all and choosing the right tool for the
job is more important than anyone being “right” or “winning.”
Hence the future of contract interpretation debate promises—at
long last—to emerge from a binary debate to a hybrid where partici-
pants recognize that the right tool for the job varies. This will not end
debate but transform it. Neither binary nor winner-take-all debate will
focus on what kinds of contracts warrant what kinds of treatment,
what the default rule should be for both determining treatment and
application, and so on. But while many articles over multiple decades
have referenced such variability in passing, the horizon promises tak-
ing such remarks more seriously. As a dip into the contracts of Berk-
shire Hathaway suggests, hybridization has greater promise than
stubborn rehashing does.
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APPENDIX: ACADEMIC CLASSIFICATIONS OF STATE LAW
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Following are excerpts from two resources taking stock of state
law on contract interpretation—one a research memorandum for
Professors Schwartz and Scott and the other sections on interpretation
in Professor Corbin’s treatise. The juxtaposition illustrates the chal-
lenge of classifying such law into simple categories such as textualist
and contextualist. Six states are presented as being textualist by one
source and contextualist by the other.
Schwartz & Scott Corbin on Contracts
Classified as Textualist160 Classified as Contextualist161
ILLINOIS
See River’s Edge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Trade Center, Inc. v. Dominick’s Finer
City of Naperville, 819 N.E.2d 806, 808 Foods, Inc., 711 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. App.
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (saying that the Illi- Ct. 1999) (“The word ‘sales,’ standing
nois supreme court has declared the alone, does not answer the questions
four corners rule, and never reversed or ‘sales of what?’ and ‘where?’ One must
modified it); Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers look to the context.”); Dawson v. Gen-
Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ill. eral Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 372 (7th
1999) (although the court suggested that Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois law)
it may later adopt another approach, (“external discussions” between the
still follows the four corners rule: an “alleged” parties prior to the formation
agreement, when reduced to writing, of their contract “can be used to demon-
“must be presumed to speak the inten- strate ambiguity, for Illinois cases con-
tion of the parties who signed it. It tinue to allow extrinsic evidence for that
speaks for itself, and the intention with purpose”).
which it was executed must be deter-
mined from the language used. It is not
to be changed by extrinsic evidence”)
(quoting Western Illinois Oil Co. v.
Thompson, 26 Ill.2d 287, 186 N.E.2d 285
(1962)).
160 Citations and parentheticals in this column are reproduced as presented, and in the
order presented, in the Schwartz and Scott survey, with the exception of minor formatting
changes to accommodate this Essay’s table format. S&S Survey, supra note 22. R
161 Citations in this column are reproduced as presented in Corbin on Contracts, with the
exception of minor formatting changes to accommodate this Essay’s table format. KNIFFIN, supra
note 3, § 24.7; id. (Cumulative Supp. 2001 Spring). Unless otherwise specified, quotations used in R
the parentheticals are from the cases but drawn from the source’s text with minimal change.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\85-6\GWN604.txt unknown Seq: 34 27-FEB-18 10:50
1658 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1625
MISSOURI
Commerce Trust Co. v. Duden, 523 Press Machinery Corp. v. Smith R.P.M.
S.W.2d 97, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) Corp., 727 F.2d 781, 784–85 (8th Cir.
(“absent ambiguity the intent of the 1984) (applying Missouri law) (“[T]he
maker of a legal instrument is to be court is justified in considering more
ascertained from the four corners of the than the mere words of the contract.
instrument without resort to extrinsic The surrounding circumstances at the
evidence”); see also Blackburn v. time of contracting and the positions
Habitat Development Co., 57 S.W.3d 378 and actions of the parties are relevant to
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001). Newco Atlas, Inc. the judicial interpretation of the con-
v. Park Range Const., Inc., 272 S.W.3d tract.”).
886 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (Contract inter-
pretation should ascertain parties’ intent
and give effect to that intent. Where the
language of the contract is unambigu-
ous, the intent of the parties will be
ascertained from the language of the
contract alone and not from extrinsic or
parol evidence of intent. “A contract is
ambiguous only if its terms are reasona-
bly open to more than one meaning, or
the meaning of the language used is
uncertain.”) (quoting Sonoma Manage-
ment Co., Inc. v. Boessen, 70 S.W.3d 475
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002)).
NEVADA
M.C. Multi-Family Development, L.L.C. Hilton Hotels v. Butch Lewis Prods., 808
v. Crestdale Associates, Ltd., 193 P.3d P.2d 919, 921–22 (Nev. 1991) (“Al-
536, 540 (Nev. 2008) (“Parol or extrinsic though some courts . . . refuse to delve
evidence is not admissible to add to, beyond the express terms of a written
subtract from, vary, or contradict . . . contract, the better approach is for the
written instruments which dispose of courts to examine the circumstances sur-
property, or are contractual in nature rounding the parties’ agreement in order
and which are valid, complete, unambig- to determine the true mutual intentions
uous, and unaffected by accident or mis- of the parties. Courts today tend to be
take . . . .”). willing to look beyond the written docu-
ment to find the ‘true understanding of
the parties.’”).
NEW HAMPSHIRE
In re Lemieux, 949 A.2d 720, 722 (N.H. R. Zoppo Co. v. City of Dover, 475 A.2d
2008) [survey offers no quotation or par- 12, 15 (N.H. 1984); Rogers v. Cardinal
aphrase but the case granted reforma- Realty, 339 A.2d 23, 25 (N.H. 1975)
tion of an instrument due to mistake, (“Intent should be determined not only
citing Corbin and the Restatement (Sec- in light of the instrument itself, but also
ond), despite plain meaning of contract in view of all the surrounding circum-
language]. stances.”).
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PENNSYLVANIA
See Shepard v. Temple University, 948 Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit,
A.2d 852, 856–57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir. 1981)
(“The intent of the parties to a written (applying Pennsylvania law) (“In a
agreement is to be regarded as being world where semantics is a science
embodied in the writing itself. The instead of an art we might be able to
whole instrument must be taken read a contract and understand it with-
together in arriving at contractual intent. out question. However, English is often
Courts do not assume that a contract’s a difficult and elusive language, and cer-
language was chosen carelessly, nor do tainly not uniform among all who use it.
they assume that the parties were igno- External indicia of the parties’ intent
rant of the meaning of the language they other than written words are useful, and
employed. When a writing is clear and probably indispensable, in interpreting
unequivocal, its meaning must be deter- contract terms. If each judge simply
mined by its content alone.”); see also applied his own linguistic background
Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Hempfield Tp. and experience to the words of a con-
Mun. Authority, 916 A.2d 1183, 1190 tract, contracting parties would live in a
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (“If a written con- most uncertain environment.”).
tract is unambiguous and held to express
the embodiment of all negotiations and
agreements prior to its execution,
neither oral testimony nor prior written
agreements or other writings are admis-
sible to explain or vary the terms of that
contract.”) (quoting Lenzi v. Hahne-
mann University, 664 A.2d 1375, 1379
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1995)).
IOWA
See Batterton Waterproofing, Inc. v. Dental Prosthetic Servs., Inc. v. Hurst,
RKC Realty, L.L.C., 669 N.W.2d 262 463 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1990) (treatise
(Table), 2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003) (when comments: “The court repudiated the
terms of the contract are unambiguous, plain meaning rule and did not impose
there is no reason for the court to rely any requirement that extrinsic evidence
on evidence not within the contract show a meaning to which the contract
itself). But see In re Mt. Pleasant Bank & language was reasonably susceptible,
Trust Co., 426 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa nor did it ask that this evidence by ana-
1988) (“Construing a contract of debata- lyzed to determine whether it showed
ble meaning by resorting to surrounding ambiguity.”).
and antecedent circumstances and nego-
tiations for light as to the meaning of the
words used is never a violation of the
parol evidence rule. And debatability of
meaning is not always discernible at the
first reading of a contract by a new
mind. More often it becomes manifest
upon exposure of the specific disputed
interpretations in the light of the attend-
ant circumstances.”).
